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The panel discussion herein was held at Fordham University School of Law on April
15, 2008. It has been edited to remove minor cadences of speech that appear awkward
in writing and to provide sources and references to other explanatory material in respect
to certain statements made by the speakers.
1. William M. Treanor is the Dean and Professor of Law at Fordham University
School of Law. William Treanor – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioP
P.ihtml?id=507&bid=844.
2. Constantine N. Katsoris is the Wilkinson Professor Law at Fordham University
School of Law. Constantine N. Katsoris – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac2bioPP.ihtml?id=507&bid=29.
3. Jill E. Fisch is the T.J. Maloney Chair of Business Law at Fordham University
School of Law and, at the time of this Lecture, was the Director of the Fordham
Corporate Law Center. Jill E. Fisch – Biography, http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/
fisch/main.htm.
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Giovanni Prezioso 9
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
Muriel Siebert 10
Muriel Siebert & Co., Inc.
WELCOME
DEAN TREANOR: Good evening, everyone. My name is Bill
Treanor. I’m the Dean of Fordham Law School. It’s my pleasure to
welcome you tonight to the Eighth Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture
on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law.
As you know, our topic tonight could not be timelier: “The
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown and the Global Financial Crisis.”
I have to say I am just stunned by the quality of the panelists. I
know we’re going to have a great discussion.
We actually are on a great roll in this room. The last event that we
had here was last week, when we had Justice Breyer 11 and Justice
O’Connor 12 speaking about judicial independence, with the Chief
Justice of Ghana 13 in the first row. And we made today’s Times
editorial page. 14 So that’s the standard. But I know this group will be
able to achieve even better things. It’s very exciting.
One of the things that we are proudest of at Fordham Law School is
our incredible business law program. 15 We are ranked in the top twenty
9. Giovanni Prezioso is a Partner in the securities and corporate law practice of
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. Giovanni P. Prezioso – Biography, http://
www.cgsh.com/gprezioso.
10. Muriel Siebert is the Founder, Chairwoman, and CEO of Muriel Siebert & Co.,
Inc. Muriel Siebert & Co., Muriel Siebert: First Woman of Finance, http://www.
siebertnet.com/html/body_mickie.html.
11. Stephen G. Breyer, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
– Biography, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf.
12. Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States – Biography, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf.
13. Georgina Theodora Wood, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic
of Ghana, http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/republic/supreme_court.php.
14. Dorothy Samuels, The Selling of the Judiciary: Campaign Cash ‘in the
Courtroom’, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2008, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/04/15/opinion/15tues4.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
15. Fordham Corporate Law Center, http://law.fordham.edu/corporatecenter.htm.
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in the nation. 16 We have an amazing business law faculty, full-time
faculty, adjunct faculty – a group that I think is really unrivaled. Among
the full-time faculty members whom we have here tonight are Susan
Block-Lieb 17 ; Gus Katsoris 18 , from whom you will be hearing in a
minute; Sean Griffith 19 ; Richard Squire 20 ; Linda Sugin 21 ; Marcella
Silverman 22 ; Carl Felsenfeld 23 . If my eyes were better, I would
probably be able to pick out even more members of the faculty. Thank
you all for coming here tonight.
We have as our organizer the Fordham Corporate Law Center,
which was established in 2001 under the leadership of John Peloso. 24
The current chair is Paul Soden. 25 We have a brilliant Faculty Director,
Professor Jill Fisch, 26 with whom I’ve taught corporate law and theory,
so I know personally how good she is. She is our T.J. Maloney
Professor of Business Law. And we are joined by T.J. Maloney 27 here
tonight, in the front row.
Jill is assisted by Professor Caroline Gentile 28 , who has done a great
job in putting this together.
The current Chair of our Corporate Center is Paul Soden, who is
with us here in the front row.
I want to make sure that you all know that we have our Journal of

16.
17.

Fordham Law School Facts, http://law.fordham.edu/facts/wom-fact3.ihtml.
Susan Block-Lieb – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml
?id=507&bid=195.
18. See supra note 2.
19. Sean J. Griffith – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml?id
=507&bid=1183.
20. Richard Squire – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml?id
=507&bid=1176.
21. Linda Sugin – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml?id
=507&bid=123.
22. Marcella Silverman – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.iht
ml?id=507&bid=135.
23. Carl Felsenfeld – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml?id
=507&bid=1146.
24. Corporate Law Center, supra note 15.
25. Paul Soden – Biography, http://www.thompsonhine.com/lawyer/PaulSoden/.
26. See supra note 3.
27. T.J. Maloney – Biography, http://center.spoke.com/info/p1NHOun/TMaloney.
28. Caroline Gentile – Biography, http://law.fordham.edu/ihtml/fac-2bioPP.ihtml?
id=507&bid=511.
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Corporate and Financial Law 29 , which is really more and more
influential. We were cited by the Supreme Court in the Arthur Andersen
case. 30 We’ve got recent issues of the Journal outside.
We are incredibly proud of this series. In the eight years that we
have had the DeStefano Lecture, we have [had] a series of brilliant
lecturers and panels that have done so much to illuminate business law
topics. 31
I’d like to acknowledge, representing Mr. DeStefano’s firm, Becker
Ross 32 , Partner Howard Justvig 33 , of the Class of 1976, who is joined by
his wife Flora and brother Gerard.
Without further ado, I want to turn matters over to Professor Gus
Katsoris, a legend, who will deliver formal remarks. Then we will be
hearing from the equally legendary Professor Jill Fisch.
Gus?
OPENING REMARKS
PROF. KATSORIS: Good evening ladies and gentlemen.
On behalf of the DeStefano family, I would like to welcome you to
the Eighth Annual DeStefano Lecture. Unfortunately, the family could
not be with us tonight, but send their regrets along with their warmest
regards.
These lectures are being sponsored by the firm of Becker Ross.
The lecture series bearing Al’s name has had a most distinguished track
record.
I would like to reflect upon the Second DeStefano Lecture in the
year 2002, when we explored the explosive topic “Enron: What Went
Wrong?” 34 I had the pleasure of chairing that panel, which included
29. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, http://law.fordham.edu/
jcfl.htm.
30. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (citing
Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: Document Retention Policies and
Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 721 (2003)).
31. See Fordham Law Corporate Law Center, Highlights of Prior Programs,
http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/priorprograms.html [hereinafter Highlights].
32. Becker Ross, LLP is a law firm located in New York, N.Y. See Becker Ross,
LLP, Marhub NY 4532571 (LEXIS).
33. See Howard Justvig – Biography, Marhub NY 453257 (LEXIS).
34. Symposium: Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate Sec. & Fin. Law,
Panel Discussion, Enron: What Went Wrong?, 8 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1 (2002)
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Kurt Eichenwald 35 , author of Serpent on the Rock, and one of the
leading financial writers of The New York Times; and Dan Dooley 36 ,
who is nationally recognized as one of the foremost forensic
accountants. The great abuses that led to the collapse of Enron and the
unfortunate demise of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen were frankly
and openly discussed that evening. 37
Shortly thereafter, the remedial legislation, called Sarbanes-Oxley,
was enacted to impose greater accountability and transparency, thus
helping to prevent future disasters like Enron. 38
However, if anyone thought that legislation alone would bring an
end to economic meltdowns, they were sadly mistaken, for last summer
we discovered there was a new virus in our midst, called subprime
mortgages. 39 Moreover, this virus was not contained to subprime
mortgages, as it opened the floodgates to such issues as: bank
liquidity, 40 the infusion of capital from sovereign wealth funds,41
restrictions on student loans, 42 the contraction of consumer credit, 43 the

[hereinafter Enron Panel Discussion].
35. Kurt Eichenwald – Biography, http://kellyaward.com/mk_award_popup/eichen
wald_k.html#eichenwald_biography.
36. Daniel Dooley – Biography, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4048/is_
200201/ai_n9031956/pg_6.
37. See generally Enron Panel Discussion, supra note 34.
38. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. Law. No. 107-204; 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116
Stat.) 745.
39. See, e.g., Elizabeth Laderman, Subprime Mortgage Lending and the Capital
Markets (Dec. 28, 2001) http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2001/el200
1-38.pdf (defining “subprime mortgage” and “subprime lending”).
40. See Heidi N. Moore, How Bad Is It?: The Bank Liquidity Problem, WALL ST.
J., July 17, 2008, at C3; Damian Paletta & Alistair MacDonald, Mortgage Fallout
Exposes Holes in New Bank-Risk Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2008, at A1; Min Zeng,
Governments’ Bonds Tumble, Reflecting Inflation Worries, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2008,
at C4.
41. See Yuka Hayashi, Japan Hopes to Lure Sovereign Investors, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 8, 2008, at C2; Harsh Joshi, Reality May Thwart Plans for India Fund, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 10, 2008, at C8; David Hale, Brave New Economy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2008,
at A14.
42. See Robert Tomsho, The Best Ways to Get Loans for College Now, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 13, 2008, at D1; Robert Tomsho, NorthStar Halts Student Loans, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 3, 2008, at B18.
43. See David Roche, The Credit Crunch Will Go On, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008,
at A25; David Roche, Recession Is Inevitable, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2008, at A19.
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uncertainty of counter-party guarantees, 44 potential downgrading of
bond insurers, 45 auction rate securities, 46 naked short selling, 47 and the
elimination of the uptick rule, 48 just to name a few.
Admittedly, the Enron debacle and the present problems are
distinguishable. 49 But there is a common denominator, and that
common denominator is greed.
Ironically, a few years ago, in 1999, with the removal of the barriers
to bank diversification by the repeal of Glass-Steagall, 50 we were led to
believe that such diversification would lessen the overall exposure to
risk. 51 How wrong they were, as we have recently witnessed some of
the major players involved in this subprime morass experiencing the
collapse of their market value. 52
Before we discuss tonight’s topic, I would like to say a few words
about the man after whom this lecture series was named, Al
DeStefano. 53
Al stands for the best Fordham Law School has to offer. He
graduated first in his class, went on to become a partner in the Becker
firm, specializing in corporate matters and mergers and acquisitions. In
his spare time, he devoted himself to numerous charitable endeavors.

44. See Krishna Guha et al., Analysis: Saviours of the Suburbs, FIN. TIMES
(London, Eng.), June 4, 2008, at 9; Martin Feldstein, Liquidity Now!, WALL ST. J., Sept.
12, 2007, at A19.
45. See James J. Eccleston, Escape From “Auction Rate Securities”, 154 CHI.
DAILY L. BULL. No. 67 (Apr. 4, 2008).
46. Associated Press, Lawmakers See Progress In AuctionRate Securities,
IHT.COM, Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/09/18/business/NA-USAuction-Securities-Hearing.php.
47. SEC DIV. OF MKT. REGULATION, KEY POINTS ABOUT REGULATION SHO (Apr.
11, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/keyregshoissues.htm.
48. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, SEC Final Rule, Release No. 34-55970, 17
C.F.R. 240 & 242, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,348 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/2007/34-55970fr.pdf.
49. Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, A Lender Failed. Did Its Auditor?, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2008, at BU1.
50. Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1933).
51. See Charlotte Bahin, Bank Business Diversification Gets a Big Boost, REG.
REP., June 30, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 4349482.
52. See, e.g., Kevin G. Hall, ECONOMY: Treasury Reforms Little Help for Current
Crisis, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 31, 2008, at A1.
53. Symposium: Inaugural Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate Sec. & Fin.
Law, Forward, 6 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 269, 269-71 (2001).
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As an adjunct member of our faculty, he shared his enormous
knowledge and experience with our students. Most importantly, Al was
straight as an arrow. What you saw was what you got.
Through this lecture series we hope to remind ourselves of our
mission: to produce skilled professionals of character, integrity, and
compassion – people like Albert A. DeStefano.
Events of the last decade have shown us the enormous breakdown
in ethical and professional standards. Greed has replaced compassion.
Self-interest has replaced loyalty. Enrichment has replaced righteousness. Deceit has replaced transparency.
Many can share in the blame, starting with the mortgage brokers or
loan reviewers, or the lenders and investment bankers who transferred
subprime mortgages and securities and sold them throughout the
world. 54 Lawyers, regulators, and rating agencies were not much help,
either. 55
Had the skilled professionals involved in packaging and selling
these products been a little more concerned with their fiduciary
obligations to the investing public, we might not be here today. In the
case of subprime mortgages and related products, what you saw was not
necessarily what you got. 56
Tonight we are fortunate to have with us a panel of distinguished
experts who will explore the causes of this virus and the effect it had on
the various areas of our economy, and hopefully tell us whether we are
in the third inning, the fifth inning, or the ninth inning of this fiasco;
suggest some remedies to alleviate the problem; and, most importantly,
to prevent it from recurring.
At this point, it is my great pleasure to present Jill Fisch, who will
present the panel. Jill is the Director of our Corporate Law Center. It
gives me great pleasure to present to you one of our own, Jill Fisch.
INTRODUCTION
PROF. FISCH: Thanks, Gus.
I’m Jill Fisch. I’m the Director of the Fordham Corporate Law Center. I am here to add my words of welcome to those of my colleagues.
54. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007).
55. Id. at 2084.
56. Id. at 2070-73.
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I am delighted to see you all here tonight. I am delighted with our
panel. I will keep my remarks brief because I know you really want to
hear from them.
I want to thank our panel for being here. I am going to introduce
them to you in a minute.
Of course, I want to thank the Becker Ross firm for establishing this
lecture series. As Dean Treanor has mentioned, it has been just a terrific
series and we have had some really spectacular programs.
I also want to acknowledge the Corporate Center’s Board of
Advisors; our Corporate Practice Partners, several of whom are here
tonight; and special thanks to Jeanne Rosendale 57 , who was instrumental
in putting this program together. We couldn’t have done it without her,
so I want to give her a special word of thanks.
I want to acknowledge the hard work of my colleagues, Professor
Caroline Gentile 58 and the Executive Director of the Center, Ann
Rakoff 59 . They really worked hard putting this program together and in
encouraging all of you to be here.
Just as a reminder, tonight’s lecture marks the Corporate Center’s
second public lecture of this academic year. In the fall, SEC
Commissioner Paul Atkins 60 delivered the A.A. Sommer Jr. Lecture. 61
This fall the Corporate Center also hosted its biannual academic
conference, the Eugene P. and Delia S. Murphy Conference on
Corporate Law. 62 This year’s conference, “Protecting Investors and the
Securities Markets” (you will agree a timely topic) featured presentation
and discussion of papers by leading academics, as well as a keynote
address by Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine 63 .
Finally, we had here at the Law School almost a dozen practitioners
over the course of this academic year, many of them loyal Fordham
57. Jeanne Rosendale – Biography, http://www.portfolio.com/resources/executiveprofiles/Jeanne-Rosendale-JD-36274.
58. See supra note 28.
59. Ann Rakoff is the Executive Director of Fordham Corporate Law Center.
Fordham Corporate Law Center, Contacts, http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/
contact.html.
60. Paul Atkins – Biography, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/atkins.htm.
61. Symposium, The Eighth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate,
Securities and Financial Law, 13 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 177 (2008).
62. See Highlights, supra note 31.
63. Leo Strine – Biography, http://courts.delaware.gov/courts/court%20of%20chan
cery/?jud_off.htm#Strine.
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alumni, to meet more informally with students in our Business Law
Practitioners Series. 64
We are starting to plan next year’s events. Just yesterday, I received confirmation that Elisse Walter 65 , Senior Executive Vice
President [of] Regulatory Policy and Programs at FINRA, has agreed to
deliver next year’s Sommer Lecture. That Lecture is scheduled for
November 6, 2008. Mark your calendars now. 66 This is sure to be a
great event.
If you aren’t already on our mailing list and you want to be informed of this and other upcoming programs, send us an e-mail or drop
off a business card so we can be sure to keep you up-to-date.
Tonight’s program, as you know, deals with the subprime lending
crisis. In planning this program, we were particularly interested in the
broad effect that the crisis has had – and continues to have – on the
financial markets. We have debated everything, in our planning calls
and in the hallways with our students, from the contributing factors to
the crisis to the proposals that seemed to emerge almost on a daily basis
for regulatory reform.
Although business scandals and crises regularly erupt on the global
financial landscape (Gus mentioned Enron, and I too was thinking of
Enron; it’s still a recent enough memory that my students recognize the
name when I talk about it in Corporations [class]), few events in recent
history have had such an extensive impact on the economy and the
global markets as the subprime crisis.
To help us understand the crisis, let me turn to the panel. I will
introduce them in alphabetical order – and our panelists are conveniently
arranged in alphabetical order so you can follow along with me. All of
our panelists’ qualifications and credentials are just too numerous to
cover in detail, so I hope they will forgive me for a little editing.
We start with Steven M. Cohen 67 , Counselor and Chief of Staff of
the Office of the New York State Attorney General. Mr. Cohen was a
Partner in the Litigation Department of Cooley Godward Kronish LLP,
64. See Fordham Corporate Law Center, Calendar of Events, Spring 2008,
http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/calendar.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
65. Elisse Walter – Biography, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/xbrl/2006/ewalter_
bio.pdf.
66. Registration and additional information for the event is available at http://law.
fordham.edu/corporatecenter.htm.
67. See supra note 5.
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where he specialized in white collar criminal defense and the trial of
criminal and civil matters. Prior to that, he served as an Assistant
United States Attorney and as a staff attorney in the New York Regional
Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission. He is a graduate of
New York University and received his law degree from the University
of Pennsylvania Law School.
Next in order, Harvey Miller 68 , Senior Partner [at] Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP, where he created and developed the firm’s Business
Finance & Restructuring Department which, as I understand it,
specializes in reorganizing distressed business entities and represents
creditors, investors, and purchasers of distressed businesses and assets.
He previously served as Managing Director and Vice Chairman of
Greenhill & Co., an international investment banking firm. He is the
author of numerous publications and the recipient of a host of awards for
distinguished service and excellence; a graduate of Brooklyn College
and Columbia Law School.
Gretchen Morgenson 69 is Assistant Business and Financial Editor
and columnist at The New York Times. She has covered the world’s
financial markets for The Times since May 1998, and won the Pulitzer
Prize in 2002 for her “trenchant and incisive” coverage of Wall Street. 70
Her articles are a frequent source of authority in legal academia. I ran a
LEXIS search yesterday and found that she has been cited in 342
scholarly articles, which is quite impressive, on topics ranging from
executive pay, stock options, bankruptcy, scandals on Wall Street, and a
host of other topics. Ms. Morgenson began her career at Vogue
magazine, and after several years as a stockbroker (so she was down in
the trenches there learning the inside story) returned to journalism,
working for Money magazine, Forbes, and Worth magazine before
joining The Times. She has also written two books. She is a graduate of
St. Olaf College.
Richard Neiman 71 is the forty-third Superintendent of Banks for the
New York State Banking Department. Immediately prior to joining the
Banking Department, Mr. Neiman served as President and Chief
Executive Officer of TD Bank USA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of The
Toronto-Dominion Bank. Mr. Neiman began his career with the Office
68.
69.
70.
71.

See supra note 6.
See supra note 7.
Id.
See supra note 8.
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of the Comptroller of Currency in Washington, D.C., serving as Special
Assistant to the Chief Counsel. He then spent ten years at Citicorp,
holding a variety of legal and regulatory positions. He returned to
Washington, D.C., and served as the Director of Regulatory Advisory
Services for PriceWaterhouse. Mr. Neiman graduated from American
University School of Government and received his law degree from
Emory.
Giovanni Prezioso 72 is a Partner in the Washington, D.C. office of
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton. I once worked there too, a very long
time ago. His practice is focused on securities and corporate law
matters, and he has served as counsel to a variety of major financial
institutions, public companies, and trade associations. From 2002 until
2006, he served as General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Under his leadership, his office coordinated the implementation of the enforcement and regulatory provisions of the SarbanesOxley Act, so he knows a good deal about regulatory reform and how to
make it work. Mr. Prezioso currently serves as the Chair of the
Executive Council of the Federal Bar Association Securities Law Committee. He is a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School.
Muriel “Mickie” Siebert 73 is the Founder, Chairwoman, and CEO
of Muriel Siebert & Co., Inc. Ms. Siebert has been called “the first
woman of finance” – the first woman to own a seat on the New York
Stock Exchange, the first to head a New York Stock Exchange member
firm, and the first woman Superintendent of Banking for the State of
New York. Ms. Siebert is involved with a wide range of nonprofit,
civic, and women’s organizations. Although she didn’t finish college,
Ms. Siebert holds eighteen honorary doctorate degrees, more than any of
us academics. Her autobiography, Changing the Rules – Adventures of
a Wall Street Maverick 74 , was published in 2002.
Last but not least, our moderator this evening is Stuart Kaswell75 , a
Partner in the Financial Services Group at Dechert LLP and head of the
firm’s Broker-Dealer, Financial Institutions, and Market Regulatory
Practice. 76 Prior to joining Dechert, Mr.Kaswell was Senior Vice
72.
73.
74.

See supra note 9.
See supra note 10.
MURIEL SIEBERT & AIMEE LEE BALL, CHANGING THE RULES: ADVENTURES OF A
WALL STREET MAVERICK (Free Press ed., 2007) (2002).
75. See supra note 4.
76. At the time of this Lecture, Mr. Kaswell was a Partner in the Financial Services
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President and General Counsel for what was then called the Securities
Industry Association, now known as SIFMA. He served as Securities
Counsel to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and as a
branch chief in the Division of Market Regulation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Mr. Kaswell has written widely on securitiesrelated matters. He is profiled in Who’s Who in America 77 and was recently listed in the peer-reviewed “Washington, D.C., Super Lawyers.” 78
He graduated from Vassar College and received his law degree from the
Washington College of Law of the American University.
So as you can see, we have a wide range of experience, expertise,
and background. On behalf of the Fordham Corporate Law Center, I
welcome you. I’m delighted that you are here.
I now turn over the floor to Stuart Kaswell.
PANEL DISCUSSION
MR. KASWELL: Thank you on behalf of all the panelists. Thank
you for that glowing introduction. Considering the previous group here,
these are big shoes to fill, but I’m confident the panelists I am privileged
to sit next to will meet that challenge.
Tonight we will try to divide this topic up into three pieces. We are
going to address them not necessarily in equal time, but rather will try to
divide it up so that we have manageable things to talk about.
First, how did we get here? How did the subprime problem start
and extend around the world? If you had told me a year or so ago that
this would spread all around the world and we would have situations like
Northern Rock in the United Kingdom 79 as part of the subprime crisis, I
would have been incredulous. I guess I still am.
The second part will be: Where are we now? What’s the current
situation? Or, as Professor Katsoris said, what inning are we in? I see
the Fed sort of acting like a specialist used to on the New York Stock
Group at Dechert LLP. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Kaswell joined Bryan Cave LLP. See
supra note 4.
77. MARQUIS, WHO’S WHO IN AMERICA 2007 (A.N. Marquis Who’s Who ed. 2006)
(1899).
78. Super Lawyers, Stuart Kaswell, http://www.superlawyers.com/washington-dc/
lawyer/Stuart-J-Kaswell/1dd0eedd-627b-4d20-9d19-543d18cfb1b5.html (last visited
Oct. 18, 2008).
79. Eric Pfanner, Future Uncertain for Northern Rock, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept.
17, 2007, at 13.
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Exchange, providing liquidity in circumstances that we haven’t seen in
some time. 80
Third, and what I think we should spend the most time on, is:
Where do we go from here? What should be the remedies that we look
for? What are the right answers going forward? Do people have the
right incentives to do the right things in the future?
There are lots of different topics that we can bring into this conversation, and I hope we will.
My goal, too, is to make this a conversation, not like so many of the
legal conferences where each person gets a couple of minutes, talks
about a case or two, and then we move on. I want this to be a much
more interactive panel. I will try to encourage everybody to chip in, so
if I haven’t heard from you I will probably call on you. I guess they’re
used to doing that in law schools.
With that, I would start with: How did we get here? Why do you
think we’re in this fix? How did the problem start? How did we find
ourselves in such a fix?
MR. MILLER: I think, as Gus said, we have established in the last
few years two basic drives of humanity: greed and sex. I don’t know if
the order is correct, but certainly that’s it.
MR. KASWELL: Am I in the right room? [Laughter]
MR. MILLER: How did we get here? Because (1) there is no institutional memory. The discussion about Enron and the frauds that
occurred there was quickly forgotten. 81 And (2) we moved into an economy where greed became good. Gecko 82 was a prophet of what was
going to happen. If you live in an economy where credit becomes freely
available (and we live in a very credit-induced society), you are going to
keep expanding that credit base until the cycle is going to end. The
bubble is going to burst at some point in time.
We live in a laissez-faire economy. I don’t want to point any fingers
at Mr. Greenspan, but regulatory oversight disappeared and exuberance
took over. 83 I think he used the expression “excessive exuberance.” 84
80. See David Leonhardt, Can’t Grasp Credit Crisis? Join the Club, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2008, at A1; Robin Sidel et al., The Week That Shook Wall Street: Inside the
Demise of Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1.
81. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 38 (discussing the collapse of Enron and
the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley).
82. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
83. See Jon Hilsenrath, Markets Police Themselves Poorly, But Regulation Has Its
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We started with this concept that every single American is entitled
to own a home. 85 Whether you can afford it or not, you are entitled to
own a home. If you ever saw that play Glengarry Glen Ross 86 , the
people who were selling aluminum siding went into selling mortgages.
When you looked at the setup of what was happening, a mortgage
originator got a huge commission on originating a mortgage. 87 The
mortgage originator just sold those mortgages to a bank in a warehouse
loan until there were enough of those mortgages put together so you
could do a securitization. 88 So the originator really didn’t care whether
the mortgagor could ever afford to service the mortgage. 89 He got his
commission or she got her commission right up front. 90 You put it into
the warehouse loan, and as soon as you had enough of these securities,
you did a securitization.
What we have done is we have sped up the complexity of the

Flaws, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2008, at A2; Greg Ip, His Legacy Tarnished, Greenspan
Goes on Defensive, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2008, at A1.
84. Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman of the Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Annual
Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996) (stating, “But how do we know when irrational
exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected
and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade?”); see also
Justin Lahart, Bernanke’s Bubble Laboratory, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2008, at A1.
85. George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, Remarks at the
National Federation of Independent Businesses at the J.W. Marriott Hotel (June 17,
2004) (“We want people owning their own business, we want people owning their own
homes . . . if you own something, you have a vital stake in the future of our country.
The more ownership there is in America, the more vitality there is in America, and the
more people have a vital stake in the future of this country.”); see also Jackie Calmes,
Bush Aides Strive for a Domestic Agenda, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2004, at A4.
86. DAVID MAMET, GLENGARRY GLEN ROSS (Grove Press 1984).
87. See Arthur Levitt Jr., Regulatory Underkill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2008, at
A13; Gretchen Morgenson & Geraldine Fabrikant, Countrywide’s Chief Salesman and
Defender, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, § 3, at 1; Liam Pleven & Susanne Craig, Deal
Fees Under Fire Amid Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2008, at A1.
88. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2060-61 (discussing recent
developments prompting investment banks, loan aggregators, and investors to intensify
due diligence on subprime residential mortgage-backed securities).
89. See id. at 2043 (“Predatory lending is a syndrome of loan abuses. . . . A major
example is asset-based lending, which consists of loans to borrowers whom the lender
knows cannot afford the monthly payments.”).
90. See id. at 2080 (discussing unfair advantage of lenders in subprime loans).

16

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIV

market so that you can’t really tell what is in there. 91 And people
stopped doing risk analysis. 92 There was a company in California where
for $55 they would confirm that you were an independent contractor. 93
For another $25, they would answer telephone inquiries. 94 So all you
had to do was fill out your mortgage application, pay the $55, and a
salesman would help you fill out the mortgage application.
Everybody just forgot about risk analysis. You had a matrix. The
theory was that if you [put] enough mortgages into the securitization,
you were spreading the risk. 95
Then, when they started taking that same rating and creating out of
the securitization collateral debt obligations (CDOs) 96 , you had tranches
from AAA down to B. 97 What you bought depended on the risk
involved. I don’t know who determined that risk except by a matrix.
Then you took the bottom tranche, the Bs, put them into a CDO, and
suddenly the Bs became AAAs. 98 Now, I don’t know how you do that.
91. See id. at 2049 (describing that there is an information asymmetry–mortgage
lenders have more information than investors as to the risk associated with these
securities.).
92. See id. at 2040, 2049 (discussing turning a blind eye to securitization and risk
analysis of subprime loans).
93. See Julie Creswell, Web Help for Getting Mortgage the Criminal Way, N.Y.
TIMES (June 16, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/16/technology/
16fraud.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&fta=y.
94. See id.
95. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2056-57 (discussing how diversification
of the loan pool in terms of geography, credit risk, prepayment risk, and legal risk can
protect investors from loss).
96. See generally Standard & Poor’s, Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO
Criteria, Mar. 21, 2002, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixed
income/cdo_criteria2002_FINALTOC.pdf (providing an introduction to Collateralized
Debt Obligations).
97. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2047.
The tranches are arrayed from the most senior to the most junior, with ‘as many as
five mezzanine or subordinated tranches going down the ratings ladder’ from AAA to
B. The senior class is the AAA tranche, the mezzanine class consists of the AA and A
tranches, and the BBB, BB, B, and unrated classes take the junior position. Any
rating of BBB-/Baa3 or above is deemed investment-grade and serves to assuage
investors’ concerns about the credit quality of the mortgages backing the securities.

Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Moody’s Investor Services, Moody’s Rating
Symbols and Definitions, Aug. 2003, available at http://www.rbcpa.com/Moody’s_
ratings_and_definitions.pdf (explaining Moody’s nine symbols [Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba,
B, Caa, Ca, C] used to designate least credit risk to greatest credit risk).
98. This refers to CDOs-Squared, a certain aspect of securitization. See, e.g.,
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In medieval times, that was an alchemist who took a stone and said,
“I’m creating gold.”
I can remember being on a panel at the end of June 2007 that was
made up of two [representatives of] hedge funds, myself, and a senior
vice president from Moody’s. The two hedge fund [representatives]
said: “There’s a ‘Perfect Storm’ forming. We can see this because the
prices that are being paid are so out of whack with the values concerned.” 99 The gentleman from Moody’s said: “Oh no. This is a contained situation. It will never expand beyond 4.6 percent of the
GDP.” 100
But everybody was investing in this. 101 I had a client who heard
about how easy it was to borrow money. He wanted to do a project. We
went to Morgan Stanley and we made a loan application. We went up
there. We got into this conference room. The bankers came in and they
said, “Here’s a proposed term sheet.” My client read the term sheet.
Suddenly I saw he got all red. He said, “Excuse me. I have to go to the
men’s room.” I was worried about what happened. I followed him into
the men’s room and I said, “Bud, what happened?” He said, “I looked at
the term sheet, and they gave us so much more than I could possibly ask
for, I didn’t know what to do.”
That was the environment that you were in. Everybody thought this
real estate boom (if you want to call it that), [and] the home equity
prices would continue to increase. 102 That never happens in history.
Nomura Fixed Income Research, CDOs-Squared Demystified (Feb. 4, 2005), http://
www.securitization.net/pdf/Nomura/CDO-Squared_4Feb05.pdf.
99. See Knowledge@Wharton, Commercial Real Estate’s Perfect Storm: What
Lies Ahead, July 12, 2006, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?article
id=1517.
100. See, e.g., Mark Whitehouse & Sarah Lueck, Subprime Fears Spread, Sending
Dow Down 1.97%, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at A1 (quoting Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson who states that the subprime mortgage crisis is largely contained).
101. Engel & McCoy, supra note 42, at 2045 (stating that today, lenders securitize
almost 80% of subprime mortgages).
102. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Women in Housing & Finance Exchequer Club Joint Luncheon (Jan. 10,
2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080110a.htm
[hereinafter Bernanke Speech].
Although poor underwriting, and, in some cases, fraud and abusive practices
contributed to the high rates of delinquency that we are now seeing in the subprime
ARM market, the more fundamental reason for the sharp deterioration in credit
quality was the flawed premise on which much subprime ARM lending was based:
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When it started to fall apart, nobody was aware that all over the
world people were investing in these derivatives. 103 Once that started to
happen, you could not contain it anymore. So the subprime crisis has
now leaked into other areas. 104
As we get more conservative, it begins to be almost like
cannibalizing because the banks start to pull back. 105 Ms. Morgenson
wrote an article on Sunday about home equity loans disappearing. 106 I
paid a lot of money to get a home equity loan. I never drew on it because I didn’t need the money. Now I get a notice from my bank that I
can’t draw on it. I don’t know if [the bank] can do that legally, but [it is]
trying to do it.
You have an environment now where, if you look at the bottom of
the feeding chain – the consumer – the consumer’s discretionary income
is contracting. 107 And if you look at it, the consumer today is paying
more than 30 percent of his discretionary income for necessities, which
means that [he] [is] not using [his] discretionary income to buy other
things. 108 It’s fuel and it’s food. [In addition], the University of
that house prices would continue to rise rapidly.

Id.
103. Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of
U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 86 (2008) (stating that the business of
securitizing mortgages has a huge global demand and a seemingly endless supply).
104. Bernanke Speech, supra note 102 (“[T]he losses in the subprime mortgage
market also triggered a substantial reaction in other financial markets.”).
105. Id. (“We also see considerable evidence that banks have become more
restrictive in their lending to firms and households.”).
106. See Gretchen Morgenson, You Thought You Had an Equity Line, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2008, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/business/
13gret.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
107. Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Univ. of North Carolina at Wilmington, Cameron School of Business’
Business Week Program (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/kohn20080226a.htm.
At the same time, continued sizable increases in the prices of food, energy, and other
commodities have raised inflation. To some extent, those increases have resulted from
strong demand in rapidly growing emerging-market economies, like China and India.
But the increases likely also reflect conditions such as adverse weather in some parts
of the world, the use of agricultural commodities to produce energy, and geopolitical
developments that threaten supplies in some petroleum-producing centers. The higher
prices have eroded the purchasing power of household income, adding to restraint on
spending.

Id.
108.

Aaron Smith, Retailers Struggle as Stimulus Money Dries Up, CNNMONEY,
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Michigan just came out with a report that estimates that 5,800 retail
stores will disappear this year because consumer confidence is basically
gone. 109
The whole concept in June and July that we could contain this crisis
has really disappeared. 110 We still have a situation where major financial institutions are undercapitalized. 111 The projection was that the subprime crisis would cost the banks – correct me if I’m wrong, Gretchen –
$250 billion in charges. 112
MS. MORGENSON: It just keeps going up. That’s what I understand. Now it’s a trillion dollars. 113
MR. MILLER: Okay. The other day in the Financial Times it was
a trillion dollars. 114 But U.S. banks will be $250-280 billion. 115 They
haven’t taken all those charges yet. Wachovia announced that they have
to raise another $7 billion of capital. 116 So we have a situation where
our financial institutions are under-capitalized, the credit has stopped.
And then you think back: Where were the rating agencies in all this? 117
MR. KASWELL: Do others agree? Do others feel that this is a
good diagnosis of where we are?
MR. COHEN: I probably have the distinction of being the leastAug. 7, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/07/news/companies/same_store_sales/
index.htm (discussing the effects on retailers as consumers must spend more of their
discretionary income on necessities).
109. Richard Curtin, March 2008 Update on Home Prices, Reuters/Univ. of Mich.
Surveys of Consumers (Mar. 2008), http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/documents.php?c=r.
110. See, e.g., HSBC Sees Progress in Subprime Recovery, WALL ST. J., May 23,
2007, at A10.
111. See, e.g., Greg Ip, Study Finds Wider Impact of Mortgage Losses, WALL. ST. J.,
Mar. 1, 2008, at A2 (revealing that many highly leveraged institutions hold capital that
only amounts to 4 to 10 percent of their total assets).
112. Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Banks Fear a Deepening of
Turmoil, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at A1.
113. See, e.g., Interview by Gillian Tett with George Magnus, Senior Econ. Advisor,
UBS (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cf507b7e-e16c-11dc-a302-0000779fd
2ac.html?nclick_check=1.
114. Id.
115. See Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 113.
116. David Enrich & Dennis K. Berman, Wachovia to Receive Big Infusion of
Capital, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2008, at C1.
117. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2060-61, 2068-69 (explaining that due
diligence is both the job of rating agencies and something that would help manage risk,
yet it is often conducted by rating agencies in a cursory manner since their interest in
the investment is not so high and is limited to legal compliance).
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sophisticated person and least-credentialed person on the panel. The
analysis is perfectly right.
When you take a step back and look at it, from my perspective,
which is as a prosecutor [and] you try to understand what happened,
there is a simple analysis: it used to be that people sold homes. At some
point, the industry changed and what really was happening was the business became selling mortgages, not selling homes. Once it was the sale
of the mortgage that began driving the market, things began to
change. 118
I remember as a kid – I grew up in the Midwest – there was a little
town bank where my parents banked. You knew that bank was going to
hold the mortgage.
MR. KASWELL: Was Jimmy Stewart the guy? [Laughter]
MR. COHEN: There is an interesting issue as to where Bedford
Falls, [the mythic town in It’s A Wonderful Life], was actually located.
But it’s exactly right. The Jimmy Stewart bank was the Bedford
Building and Loan. There’s that great scene where there’s the run on the
bank (I’ll keep it brief, but it’s worth seeing It’s a Wonderful Life 119 ) and
the Jimmy Stewart character explains, “Your money isn’t with me. It’s
not here behind the counter. It’s in Harvey’s home. That’s where your
money is. And Harvey’s money is in Gretchen’s home.” That model
ceased to exist. I don’t know when it ceased to exist, but at some point
it did.
The very structure of what most lay people understood to be the
foundations of a mortgage system changed. So the risk moved away
from the people who [and institutions that] were providing the mortgages. 120 The mortgage providers began selling mortgages. They had an
interest in selling as many mortgages as possible.121 They didn’t have to
worry about the risk.
That is the simple analysis of how this whole thing began. If you
think about it from that perspective, that paradigm (and it’s easy to do
after the fact) you understand where this is going to lead you, which is to
a situation in which there is no real foundation for the value of those
mortgages.
118. Id. at 2045 (outlining the advent and expansion of subprime securitization into
a $525.7 billion industry by 2005).
119. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films (II) 1946).
120. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2041.
121. See id. at 2043-44.
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MR. KASWELL: When I first learned about this, I thought it was a
good thing to encourage people to buy their first house, and we were
going to help them, because they didn’t have enough money [for a down
payment].
MR. MILLER: If they can service the mortgage.
MR. KASWELL: I understand.
MR. MILLER: If you’re going to do financing at 120 percent of
value, then I think you have a problem.
MS. MORGENSON: These homes were sold, I think, on the basis
of ever-rising home prices. 122 That is a very important part of the analysis. That has stopped, as we all know.
I would certainly second what Harvey said, which is that everyone
along the way in each step of this process basically had an interest in
looking the other way.
First of all, you had the loan originator or the mortgage broker.
They got paid more in commission for the riskier loans that they would
make. 123 So if you were going to do an FHA loan, which is an old
standby government-ensured-to-a-degree loan for a fixed mortgage for a
thirty-year period, 124 you got paid far less than if you did a two-year
ARM 125 that would adjust after two years to a skyrocketing interest rate
that virtually no one could withstand, and with a hard prepay penalty 126 ,
which means that you cannot prepay, you can’t get out of it somehow.
Those kinds of loans, which were toxic loans to most people 127 (I don’t
care if you’re low-income or high-income; nobody can withstand a huge
interest rate increase like these loans were creating) – those kinds of
122. Patrick McGeehan, Home Prices Start to Dip, Recalling ‘90s Slump, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2008, at A23.
123. Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 11, 2006, at
70.
124. See id.
125. An ARM is an adjustable rate mortgage. See id.
126. See id. (“[B]orrowers who jumped into so-called option ARM loans have
another, more urgent problem: payments that are about to skyrocket.”).
127. See id.
With its temptingly low minimum payments, the option ARM brought a whole new
group of buyers into the housing market, extending the boom longer than it could
have otherwise lasted, especially in the hottest markets. Suddenly, almost anyone
could afford a home – or so they thought. The option ARM’s low payments are only
temporary. And the less a borrower chooses to pay now, the more is tacked onto the
balance.

Id.
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loans paid more. Wall Street paid more for those loans to put them into
the securitization pools. 128 The mortgage brokers received more to write
the loans. 129 Every step of the way, people were paid to look the other
way, including the rating agencies. 130 I think that is a very important
explanation, or at least part of the puzzle of why we got here.
MR. NEIMAN: I like to characterize it as [a situation] where risk
controls and best practices and regulatory supervision did not keep pace
with innovation. 131 Innovation at the center of this is really the securitization process.
When you think back on the S&L crisis, one of the things about the
S&L crisis is you did know where the risk lay. It lay in the institutions
that were making those commercial development loans. The development of the securitization process really was a dispersal of risk.132 If
you had asked anybody back then, “Is that a good thing?” of course it
has benefits. 133 Part of the challenges that we are seeing now is that you
don’t know where all the risk lies, so you don’t know where to focus
your attention and where the risks are in the system. 134
The other thing the securitization process provided was an opportunity for global investors seeking higher yield. It provided a great
opportunity for mortgage loan originators to go out and create with these
misaligned incentives products that could be sold through that process to
global investors seeking higher yield around the world.
When we talk about rating agencies not being able to keep track of
issues – How do you value those instruments? How do regulators asses
the risk? [What about] risk managers within those institutions? [What
about] compliance and regulators globally? It really is a case where

128.
129.
130.
131.

See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2060.
See Der Hovanesian, supra note 123.
See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2055-56, 2068.
Caroline Bradley, Private International Law-Making for the Financial Markets,
29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 127, 128 (2005).
132. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2056-57.
133. See id.
134. See, e.g., Holly Sraeel, Analytics of The Future? A Question Not Easily
Answered, BANK TECHNOLOGY NEWS, Sept. 1, 2008, http://www.americanbanker.com/
printthis.html?id=20080828N5GYOMHS&btn=true (discussing the fact that the
industry became overly reliant on credit-risk-scoring models that did not give a 360degree view of borrowers, or adequately address the ‘full range of risk factors in the
market’).
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innovation was well ahead of supervision. 135
MR. KASWELL: Giovanni and Mickie, do you have some thoughts
here too?
MR. PREZIOSO: I think my view is probably closer to Richard’s
than to some of the others.
I think it is important here to step back and think about incentives
and structure. While greed probably played a part in all of this, to the
extent people broke laws, which is a distinct issue from greed, we ought
to be punishing those people aggressively.
As much as I admire being part of the tail-end of the Baby Boom
generation (and we like to believe we exceeded everyone who came
before us in every way), I don’t actually think we are setting new alltime records for greed in this generation of human beings. I think it’s
something that has been around for a while.
And even the process of securitization is not something new. 136 In
my misspent youth as an associate at Cleary Gottlieb in the 1980s, I did
a lot of securitization of mortgages. We didn’t invent securitization three
or four years ago. This is not a new thing.
The old world of thrifts, as Richard has pointed out, had its own
imperfections that really were what led, not only to a lot of expensive
mortgages for people and unavailability of mortgage money in key times
when people needed it, but also to the S&L crisis ultimately. 137
So I think it is important to step back. A lot of you probably have
had a similar kind of experience. I happened to go to grade school with
nuns. Whenever you got in trouble with the nuns, if you said, “I didn’t
do it,” after the nun is whacking your hand with the ruler, the nun would
say something like, “It doesn’t matter. I’m sure you did something else
just as bad.” That was true, it was always true, but it didn’t create
135. See Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of Fr., Speech at the Int’l Monetary
Fund – Bank of France – Bank of England Conference: Challenges of Financial Innovation for the Conduct of Monetary Policy (Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.bis.org/
review/r080212a.pdf; see also Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2050-51; Der
Hovanesian, supra note 123.
136. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2045; Kyle Richard & Melissa Kosiba,
Securitization: A Platform to Debate Accounting, THE CPA J., Oct. 2005, available at
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2005/1005/perspectives/p10.htm (“The securitization market began in the early 1970s with the issuance of bonds backed by mortgage
loans.”).
137. See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The S&L Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S57,
S64-66 (1991).
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incentives to good conduct and it didn’t change the way you behaved.
I think it is awfully important here to try to be very realistic about
what is different as opposed to the things that are with us always.
In thinking about that, what captured some of this for me was a
report that the IMF did that just came out last week. They do an annual
or semi-annual Global Stability Report. 138 They talked in this report –
and they were criticizing their own report of a year ago when they said
this – about a collective failure to appreciate and anticipate the breadth
of what was happening in the mortgage market. 139
There are two parts to that I would emphasize: (1) the collective
element, and (2) the breadth element.
The collective element is pretty astounding, when you look back.
Not only the IMF when it was writing this report a year ago, but [also]
Chairman Bernanke as late as June was giving testimony saying that the
risk was confined, looked like it wouldn’t spill over into the general
economy. 140 If you look at the rating agencies, they weren’t seeing this.
If you look at the investment banks – this is something that is alluded to in the IMF report – it wasn’t that they weren’t doing risk analysis.
[Rather], it’s that when they were doing the risk analysis on terms that
the IMF refers to as “even assuming unprecedented deterioration of the
market,” they weren’t coming up with these numbers, these kinds of
losses. 141
138. See Int’l Monetary Fund, World Econ. & Fin’l Surveys, GLOBAL FINANCIAL
STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL
SOUNDNESS, Apr. 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf
[hereinafter GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT].
139. See id. at ix.
140. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress Before the H. Comm. on
Fin’l Services (July 18, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/
bernanke20070718a.htm.
For the most part, financial markets have remained supportive of economic growth.
However, conditions in the subprime mortgage sector have deteriorated significantly,
reflecting mounting delinquency rates on adjustable-rate loans. In recent weeks, we
have also seen increased concerns among investors about credit risk on some other
types of financial instruments. Credit spreads on lower-quality corporate debt have
widened somewhat, and terms for some leveraged business loans have tightened.
Even after their recent rise, however, credit spreads remain near the low end of their
historical ranges, and financing activity in the bond and business loan markets has
remained fairly brisk.

Id.
141.

See GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 138, at xv-xvi.
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You have read about these stories of an investment bank that took a
very big loss in the fall as part of what was in fact a bearish bet. They
took a very bearish position. They bet that the market was going to go
down. They still ended up losing a lot of money, because the way they
set up their hedges was structured, [based on their belief that the market]
was going to go down. They thought it was going to go down a lot, but
they just didn’t think it was going to go down this much.
I think it is interesting to focus on that second element. It’s not that
people didn’t see that there were going to be problems in subprime.
There were a lot of people who thought there were going to be problems
in subprime. 142 What nobody saw, [however], was how bad they were
going to be.
It’s the difference between the ten-year flood and the hundred-year
flood. The way you prepare for those is very different. Sometimes in
preparing for the ten-year flood you may do things that are actually
worse for you when you get to the hundred-year flood.
So I think that focusing a little bit on how it is that so many
institutions in so many different positions – admittedly, many with conflicts of interest, which compromise our whole system – depend on
people having self-interest driving them and regulators having a broader
picture. No one saw this. Why didn’t they see it?
I’m focusing a little bit on the question of transparency in the
marketplace, because what we really count on in our markets is
signaling from the marketplace about losses, [and] about potential risk.
We all watched the central planning model in the Soviet Union and a lot
of other countries. 143 Trying to assemble all the data about risk is a useful thing to do, and indeed I think as we look forward, when we get to
that later, we can talk a little about how that would play out in our
federal system, getting that information together.
But I also think it is worth talking about how it is that the market –
with so many people who I believe were no more or less greedy, no
more or less intelligent, no more or less focused on trying to reduce risk
than any of our ancestors in other eras of financial ups and downs – got
it wrong, and what that says about the [significance of the] lack of
transparency and illiquidity in this market as we go forward.
142. See Steven Pearlstein, Subprime Meltdown: Analysis, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 18,
2007, at D1.
143. See Stanislaw Wellisz & Ronald Findlay, Central Planning and the “Second
Economy” in Soviet-Type Systems, 96 ECON. J. 646, 646 (1986).
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MR. KASWELL: Mickie, what do you think? Is there nothing
new under the sun here?
MS. SIEBERT: I think, first of all, [that] all you had to do was to
go out to the country. If you went to Southampton, a lot of the old-line
stores were replaced by real estate companies. They were either selling
or they were mortgage companies. You could see that all over the
country.
I think the money was too vast and too fast.
I looked at some of this because I had been asked to testify in
Enron, 144 which I did when Enron was going on. I was totally shocked.
The loan that I had been asked to go into by Enron was a totally
different kind of loan, but it involved out-of-the-country, off-balancesheet items. I called it “total moral bankruptcy” to the Senate, because it
needed the permission and the blessings of the lawyers, the accountants,
the Wall Street firms, and the Wall Street banks. 145 Without any of
those four the Enron loan that I had been asked to look at would not
have been in existence.
I looked at the individuals who were speculating in Florida, in
Miami. They would buy apartments they had no intention of living in.
They were buying them and they were flipping them. It was so prevalent that some of the builders made people sign a paper that they
couldn’t sell it for a year. But it was there, and it was obvious. And
these people were getting mortgages.
I just cannot see why some of the people didn’t speak up. When I
read about one of our banks bringing the subprime back on to their
balance sheet, back into the country, and they needed X billions of
dollars to do this – where were the regulators? Where were the accountants? We have to ask these questions.
144. See Muriel Siebert, Chairman and CEO of Siebert Financial Corp., Testimony
Before the U.S. S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations (Dec. 11, 2002), http://
hsgac.senate.gov/121102siebert.htm.
145. See Protecting the Investor, DOLLARS & SENSE NEWSLETTER, (Muriel Siebert &
Co., Inc., New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2002, available at http://www.siebertnet.com/forms/
body_newsletter.asp?Idx=26
Enron, in my opinion, represents a total moral bankruptcy. It took more than the
officers and the directors of the company. It required the participation of accountants,
lawyers, and investment and commercial banks. As we all know, the investing public
and employees paid dearly, many of whom will never be able to recoup their losses. It
is imperative that this does not happen again.

Id.
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I wasn’t smart enough to see the depth of it because it’s not my
business. I was shocked as I saw the growth of it and I saw the way it
was so totally prevalent.
I did some checking when this happened. I called some people I
hadn’t talked to in years. They told me about the way mortgage applications were totally falsified. 146 They would create an application and
create an income. 147 So it wasn’t a matter of people just buying a larger
home than they could afford. It also got into lack of knowledge of some
of the people who were buying homes. I heard of one couple in Cleveland. (I’m from Cleveland originally). I did a little checking. They were
going to buy a house for $150,000. A working couple. Good history of
work. The mortgage broker said, “With rates this low, you can buy a
house for $250,000.” So they bought a house for $250,000 and they’re
now being foreclosed. Where were our ethics? They seem to have been
on a long vacation.
MR. KASWELL: What we hear in different points of view is
sometimes the incentives were there and people forgot their morals.
Other times people had incentives perhaps only for one part of the
transaction but it didn’t apply across the board, and so the system failed.
In other cases, it may just have been abuses and people doing the wrong
thing. As Giovanni said, that’s another problem.
MR. MILLER: But when you say “doing the wrong thing,” I don’t
think you can excuse things by saying “greed has always been here, and
therefore it’s not any different than any other situation.” I think greed
probably preceded the 1929 collapse. But the 1929 collapse and the
Depression resulted in some corrective legislation. We moved into a
world of laissez-faire. If you are going to say laissez-faire, greed is
going to come to the forefront.
If you take the Carlisle Capital Fund, which goes public in
Amsterdam, and a $29 billion fund that leverages up thirty-three times 148
– this is an overwhelming thing.
146. See Kenneth R. Harney, New Report: Housing Boom Stimulating Mortgage
Application Fraud Boom, REALTYTIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/
20050801_applicationfraud.htm (“What sort of games are people playing with
mortgage applications? You name it – everything from little white lies about income or
assets all the way up to what the FBI calls ‘air loans’ that are based on completely
fabricated information.”).
147. See id.
148. See Emma Trincal, Carlyle Raises First Fund Since Debacle, HEDGEWORLD
NEWS, Apr. 7, 2008, 2008 WLNR 6531518.
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I don’t want to get into politics, but we had a national policy in
favor of laissez-faire. 149 Greed is a great driver, as I said, and people are
going to take more risks.
And where did the hedge funds fit into all of this? Where did the
private equity funds fit into all of this? That added to it. 150
MR. KASWELL: One of the things we all agreed we would do is
talk about the issues, as you’ve done, Harvey, but not talk about the
politics, which is fine. I think that works us into where we are now. We
are in this situation, which I don’t think anybody anticipated. I think
we’ve got ourselves in this situation now where [many] people are in
terrible shape personally. You read about the stories of the foreclosures
rates. 151 The stories even [show that] people’s pets are being abandoned
in homes. The human element of this is really very tragic. And again,
some people got into it for all the wrong reasons. Some people were just
naïve.
But where are we now? What do people think? Gretchen, what do
you think?
MS. MORGENSON: I was talking with one of my sources yesterday who is a very high-level executive in fixed income at a major firm.
I said, “Okay, what inning are we in?” That’s the metaphor everyone wants to use.
He said, “We’re in the seventh inning.”
I said, “Oh, great, that’s great.”
He said, “Except it’s a double-header.” [Laughter]
Every time we seem to think that we’ve gotten to a point where we
can start to feel maybe that’s the last shoe to drop, we get another big
huge announcement from a firm or bank that needs to be recapitalized or
that needs to raise capital, that coughs up some massive loss or other, or
has to bring something back onto their balance sheet. 152
I truly want to be bullish. I am tired. I have been writing about this

149. See SHERRYL DAVIS KASPER, THE REVIVAL OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE IN AMERICAN
MACROECONOMIC THEORY: A CASE STUDY OF THE PIONEERS 2 (2002).
150. See Research Recap, Role of Hedge Funds in Subprime Crisis Examined,
http://www.researchrecap.com/index.php/2007/12/21/role-of-hedge-funds-in-subprimecrisis-examined/.
151. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Builders and Homeowners Under Strain, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 2008, at C1.
152. See, e.g., Eric Dash, Surprise Loss at Wachovia Stirs Profit-Season Unease,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at C1.
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for more than a year now. I would love to move on to something else.
But I really feel like the way this has leached into the entire financial
system means that it is going to be with us for quite a while, I think,
throughout this year and into 2009.
One of the reasons is that a lot of the exotic mortgages that were
created in the midst of the boom have not yet even reset to high
levels. 153 Now, the low rates that the Fed has pushed have helped that
and [have] helped to ameliorate that situation. 154 But I think we have a
whole raft of loans that were made where people did not have to pay
down any principal. These were negative-amortization loans. 155 They
only would have to start paying the principal down when the loan
became 125 percent of the value of the property. 156 That whole group of
loans I think is still out there, possibly waiting to be a problem that hits
the system. So I would have to agree with my Wall Street source.
MR. NEIMAN: There is a lot of focus on the impact on the
financial institutions and the continued write-downs and the pullback on
credit and how that is going to put downward pressure on the economy.
[But] you can’t lose sight of the impact on communities. As a state
regulator, it is clear [to me]. In New York it’s interesting because New
York as a state certainly hasn’t been impacted as much as the nation.
New York’s foreclosure filings are up 10 percent 2007 over 2006.157
The nation is up 75 percent. 158 States like Ohio, California, and Nevada
are up over 200 percent. 159
But having said that, [some] areas of New York are being disproportionately impacted. Concentrated areas within Brooklyn and Queens
153. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn & Vikas Bajaj, The Tricky Task of Offering
Aid to Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at A1.
154. See, e.g., Norm Alster, Some Banks (Yes, Banks) May Be Back in Favor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at BU5 (“[S]ome financial companies . . . [are] positioned to
benefit from the flurry of recent Federal Reserve moves to cut interest rates and restore
market liquidity. . . . [Also], some regional banks are now poised to benefit from
plunging short-term rates.”).
155. See generally Kenneth R. Harney, Should Risks Beget Rules?, WASH. POST,
Apr. 8, 2006, at F01.
156. Home Mortgage Loans, Inc., Negative Amortization Loans, http://www.home
mortgageloansinc.com/blog/?p=19 (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
157. See RealtyTrac Staff, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007,
RealtyTrac, Inc. Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/
pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=3988&accnt=64847.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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account for almost 40 percent of those foreclosure filings, Suffolk and
Nassau over 20 percent. 160 Those are areas – particularly Long Island,
where escalating home prices really drove people with a very highpressure sales force, and provided opportunities for people to purchase
homes, particularly using products like these Option ARMs, where the
majority of those individuals [were] paying minimum payments.
We are doing a lot of outreach into communities, trying to bring
borrowers together with lenders. 161 One woman I met with recently was
facing the loss of her home, a single mother with four children. She said
the most disturbing thing that upsets her is not the fact that she is losing
her home, but [rather] the fact that there are four or five other people on
her very block that are ashamed and embarrassed to come seek help
because they really feel that they put themselves into this position. So I
think the impact on communities, even in New York, should not be
underestimated.
MR. KASWELL: You see at the institutional level [that] debt markets in some cases have just frozen up. 162 Different institutions have
securities in their portfolio that they can’t price. They know they’re
worth something, but they don’t know [precisely how much] they are
worth. You see lenders trying to borrow money. There are lenders and
borrowers out there, but the transactions just don’t seem to be working.
The markets seem to have seized. It is a very difficult situation for
people who are in business right now.
Harvey, I don’t think you are going to see that situation where your
client gets offered more money than he could ever dream of again for
some time.
MR. MILLER: I think what we are missing is [that] this has
leached over into the commercial area. 163 The drop in liquidity is affecting commercial transactions; transactions have commitments from
financial institutions to close, and suddenly the financial institution or
160. See N.Y.S. Banking Dep’t, New York State Foreclosure Filings by County of
One-to-Four Family Homes: First Quarter 2008, http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr
080529.pdf.
161. See N.Y.S. Banking Dep’t, Senate Democrats, NYS Banking Department and
Financial Institutions Join Forces to Help New York Borrowers Protect Their Homes,
Feb. 10, 2008, http://www.banking.state.ny.us/pr080210.htm.
162. See, e.g., Leonhardt, supra note 80.
163. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Dealbook Extra, Radio Static, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 2008, at C6; Charles Duhigg, Deal to Buy Mortgage Company Collapses, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008, at C3.
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the syndicate says, “Oh no, we’re not ready to close.” You see that in
[situations like when] Finish Line and Genesco were supposed to merge
[and abandoned the deal]. 164
You see it happening in Chapter 11 cases, where suddenly the exit
financier says, “I’m not financing.” Think of Delphi Corporation. 165
Solutia for a long while wasn’t able to get exit financing. 166 There’s this
retrenchment.
Many of the institutions are scared to death that if somebody starts
liquidating these securities, they are all going to have to mark-tomarket. 167 If they have to mark-to-market, what is it going to do to their
balance sheets? On one hand, if you are a real pessimist, you could say
we’re on the edge of a “Perfect Storm.” Then, if you want to say it’s the
seventh inning and it is only a single game, everything is going to work
out. [On the other hand], I think there is a real problem about it working
out. I think the liquidity crisis is very serious for the commercial world.
And it has leached right through subprime.
MR. KASWELL: Just because I’m physically removed from the
folks at the other end, please chime in.
MR. PREZIOSO: I would just add to the point you were making
about the seizing up and spilling over – [the fact that] a lot of people did
not forecast this means that a lot of people don’t have confidence in
what the future is going to bring.
There are a couple of interesting ways in which there has been a
negative feedback loop that people have commented on here. To the
extent the markets have seized up and institutions have had to mark to
model instead of marking to actual market prices, they have to make
predictions about the future at precisely a time when they have the least
market information available to them to make those predictions. 168 That
164. See Reuters, Footwear Retailers End Plans to Merge, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2008, at C4.
165. See Nick Bunkley, Delphi Drops Finance Plan but Expects Another Soon, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2007, at C8; John D. Stoll & Kathy Shwiff, GM to Tap Rest of $4.5
Billion Credit Line, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2008, at A2, available at http://www.
collegejournal.com/article/SB122186953006359023.html.
166. See Jeffrey McCracken & John D. Stoll, Delphi’s Bankruptcy Exit Hits a Snag,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2008, at C1.
167. See John Berlau, Maybe the Banks Are Just Counting Wrong, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 2008, at A15; Arthur Levitt Jr. & Lynn Turner, How to Restore Trust in Wall
Street, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A17.
168. See Ethan Penner, Of Markets and Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2008, at
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is a challenge not only to those institutions, but also to regulators.
It creates a dynamic where, if you project losses higher than ever
before (let’s say suddenly going to 10 percent loss assumptions) you
write down a lot of assets. Those announcements come out. People
think the situation is going to get worse. The projections go down even
further. So people who were projecting cumulative losses of 10 percent
in October, in terms of the rating agencies, were at 19 percent in
January, I think. So everybody writes down their assets even more.
The more this goes on, you also begin to see – and this is an
inevitable and unfortunately cyclically-enhancing part of the regulatory
system – that when times are good, regulators are hard-pressed to actually get people to tighten up capital and lending standards, which is
precisely when they should be [doing so], of course. When times are
bad (like right now) you have everyone very acutely aware of the
scrutiny they are under, in terms of every extension of credit they make.
As they go through that exercise, [people] become more sensitive to the
way regulators are going to look at what they are doing. [At the same
time], regulators are very sensitive to being criticized for not adequately
overseeing folks.
I think there is an element that grows out of the lack of ability to see
prices in real-time – that is not just at the financial institution level or the
instruments themselves, but rather at the level of the real estate market
itself, which is one of the less liquid markets out there, and one in which
we all know home sellers don’t like to (as they say in the stock market)
capitulate to a bear market. 169 Everyone believes their home should only
go up in value. 170
I think that is an element that makes it quite difficult to know when
A23; Susan Pulliam et al., U.S. Investors Face an Age of Murky Pricing, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 12, 2007, at A1.
169. See Mark Gongloff, Ahead of the Tape, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2008, at C1;
Michael M. Grynbaum, Jittery Markets Make the Most of Good News, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2008, at A1; James R. Hagerty, U.S. News: Home Sales Rise in Hard-Hit
Areas, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, at A3.
170. See Sushil Cheema, Owners Think Home Values Have Risen, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 7, 2008, at D6.
[According to a] second-quarter survey . . . 62% of the 1,361 homeowners who
responded said they believe the value of their home increased over the previous year.
But . . . that high level of optimism is out of sync with reality. [D]ata show[s] that
77% of U.S. homes depreciated in value over the past year, while only 19%
appreciated.

Id.; Peter Y. Hong, Should You Buy Now?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, Part C, at 1.
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this is going to end; all those factors, if the market started to turn, would
tend by the same token to reinforce pretty quickly a positive feedback
loop.
I think the regulators are making a clear effort to show that they
want things to succeed. 171 But I am no prognosticator of the future. In
terms of where we are now, I just think not very many people know.
MS. SIEBERT: I think that we have to look towards the accountants. I’m sorry that this panel is not in two weeks, because we would
have had all the earnings out by the major banks. The auditors are not
going to allow banks just to tell them, “Oh, don’t worry about this.”
They are forcing them to bring the assets back. They are forcing them to
mark them to market to the best of their ability. 172
We had Wachovia out yesterday. 173 In the next week we are going
to have a half-a-dozen of other major banks out, plus a lot of small
banks. Then we’ll get an idea. No auditor is going to bend over backwards when they can become the next Arthur Andersen.
I think that we are going to have to look at some of these earnings
that are coming out. We are going to have to see whether these loans
were brought back to the country or are they still sitting somewhere. I
believe that the accountants will have a tendency to be extremely
conservative. We will have information on the rest of a lot of financial
institutions within a couple weeks.
MR. KASWELL: One of the things I remember from the Sarbanes171. See Greg Hitt, Damian Paletta, & Deborah Solomon, Bailout Negotiations in
Disarray, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1; see also Karen Richardson & Damian
Paletta, Spitzer Warns Bond Insurers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2008, at A1.
172. See Jon Hilsenrath et al., Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Become
Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, at A1.
173. See Eric Dash, Wachovia Is Said To Raise Billions Amid Rising Credit Losses,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, at A16.
The Wachovia Corporation, the country’s fourth largest bank, is raising several billion
dollars from outside investors because of mounting housing losses and an ill-timed
acquisition of a big California mortgage lender, people briefed on the matter said
Sunday night.
It is unclear whether the investment will come from the issuing of new shares of stock
to the public or from private investors. Wachovia said Sunday night that it would
move up the release of its first-quarter earnings to Monday from Friday, without
explanation. That has led to speculation that an announcement of an investment deal
could come with its earnings report.

Id.; David Enrich & Dennis K. Berman, Wachovia to Receive Big Infusion of Capital,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2008, at C1.
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Oxley experience was – and I can’t remember the sequence anymore –
this feeling of “well, there were a couple of big companies that failed,”
and then it seemed like it was one after the other. If it hadn’t been that
sort of succession of problems, I don’t think in Washington we would be
talking about Sarbanes-Oxley today. It just seems like [everyone is
asking], “Is there any end in sight?” I think that is what crystallized the
political consensus in Washington to say, “Yes, it’s time to pass something.” I am not sure where we are in that spectrum right now, but I
pretty clearly remember that.
MS. MORGENSON: I think that part of the problem that we are
having with a resolution is just from the standpoint of the free market;
i.e., vulture funds, people who have an interest in distressed properties,
should be starting to tiptoe into some of these markets. But I think that
one of the reasons we are not seeing more of that is the complexity of
the securitization pools, which create difficulty in even finding out who
owns which part of the note. 174 Now you are starting to see bankruptcy
judges actually stopping lenders from foreclosing because they don’t
prove standing because the note has not been assigned properly.175
These are all sort of boring little details that get sloughed off during a
boom, and certainly did in this case.
This is now making it extremely complicated to extricate good
loans from bad in these pools so that people can step in and say, “Look,
I’ll buy that piece and this piece and the other piece.” The securitization, I think, contributed to the problem on the up-side and now it is
contributing to the problem on the down-side as well. 176
MR. MILLER: And it’s more complex because in 2005 the
Bankruptcy Code was amended so that bankruptcy judges don’t have
any discretion anymore to stop repo securitizations from creditors fore174.
175.

See Engel & McCoy, supra note 54, at 2045-48.
See, e.g., In re Hayes, No. 07-13967, 393 B.R. 259, 2008 WL 3870820 (holding that the entity moving for relief from a stay as to mortgage property as trustee of a
corporate entity other than that named as mortgagee in original mortgage documents
failed to satisfy its burden of tracing mortgage from this original mortgagee to separate
entity for which it was allegedly acting as trustee, and did not have standing, as party in
interest, to pursue stay relief) (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008); In re Maisel, 378 B.R. 19, 22
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (holding that the party moving for relief from a stay to exercise
its purported rights in mortgaged property did not have requisite standing where, at time
the motion was filed, it had not yet obtained assignment from the original mortgage
lender).
176. See John H. Makin, Recession 2008?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2007, at A13.
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closing and taking their collateral. 177 So you have a much diminished
Bankruptcy Court.
If you look at American Home Mortgage 178 and similar pending
cases, the secured lender goes in and says, “You have no authority to
stop me from foreclosing,” and [takes its] collateral and [runs]. And
then you don’t know who the counter-party is. You really don’t know in
half the cases.
MR. COHEN: The other thing that has happened here is that
because of the complexity, unlike in past versions of these kinds of
crises, there aren’t yet the big bumper-sticker law enforcement cases.
We don’t have an Enron. Oftentimes, when you get those big cases,
rightly or wrongly (you can argue that you get a skewed perception from
looking at the worst examples) they do tend to sharpen the issues.
From a prosecutor’s standpoint, these are very difficult cases to
wade into and to get your arms around, in part because, to the extent
there was misconduct (and we can argue over whether or not a lot of this
was driven by misconduct), it was a very broad, almost institutional,
industry-wide accepted type of [mis]conduct. 179 To the extent that these
were broad practices, they ended up being very complex, involving all
sorts of phases of transactions. 180 So you don’t even have what is akin
to the autopsy that is placed out there for everybody to look at.
MR. MILLER: Wait, Steve. Wait for Countrywide. 181
MR. COHEN: I think Countrywide will be the first big one. From
177. See S. Todd Brown, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 569, 586, n. 61 (2007) (citing multiple
articles discussing how the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code limited judicial
discretion); Karen Gross et al., 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 497, 502-03 (2006) (discussing the
2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code).
178. See Peg Brickley, American Home Creditors to Review Payment Plan, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 20, 2008, at B3D.
179. See, e.g., Mark Maremont, FDIC Faces Mortgage Mess After Running Failed
Bank, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2008, at A1.
Federal officials heap much of the blame for the subprime mortgage mess on lenders,
claiming they recklessly made too many high-cost home loans to borrowers who
couldn’t afford them. It turns out that the U.S. government itself was one of the
lenders giving out high-interest, subprime mortgages, some of them predatory. . . .

Id.; Ruth Simon, Investors Press Lenders on Bad Loans, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2008, at
C1.
180. See Maremont, supra note 179.
181. See Peg Brickley & Donna Kardos, Credit Crunch: Countrywide Seeks to
Block Abuse Inquiry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2008, at A14 (commenting on lawsuits for
creditors’ abuses of homeowners).
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a law enforcement perspective, these are cases that have been harder to
get traction on than some of the earlier ones.
MR. MILLER: But I think after Enron and after what happened to
Arthur Andersen 182 , and talking about auditors, you would have thought
that the accounting profession, the auditors in particular, would have
been very careful.
If you read the preliminary examiner’s report in New Century 183
about some of the things that KPMG did, you ask, “Is this Enron all over
again? Was KPMG more concerned about its fees than actually doing
an audit?” 184
MR. COHEN: That gets back to your earlier point, which is: how
much of this is driven by greed? How many of these fixes that they are
going to look at and say, “Oh well, we can impose these solutions,”
really were available years ago?
The simplest thing to understand is the liar loan. You [Ms.
Morgenson] wrote a great piece on this a while ago, about how easy it
would have been to spot. 185 You can say, “Well, the person shouldn’t
have lied on the loan application.” Well, how hard would it have been
to do the due diligence on that loan application to find out that, in fact,
the application was bogus? Those things didn’t happen.
MR. MILLER: Did anybody want to find out?
MR. COHEN: That’s exactly right. They didn’t want to know.
MR. KASWELL: One of my stories I tell young associates is
Client A calls up – let’s say it’s a broker-dealer – and says, “We want to
do X in the market. Everybody else is doing it but we can’t do it.”
I say, “You can’t do that.”
“Well, everybody else is doing it. Folks at Firm B are doing it.”
So you call up your friend at Firm B and say, “Are you doing X?”
He says, “What, are you crazy? We can’t do that.”
Unfortunately, that sounds like it didn’t go on in this setting.
182.
183.

See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
See Peg Brickley & Amir Efrati, Credit Crisis: KPMG Aided New Century
Missteps, Report Says, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2008, at A6; Schroeder v. New Century
Holdings, Inc., 387 B.R. 95 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
184. See Press Release, U. S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Three Former
KPMG Auditors for Altering Audit Working Papers (Mar. 30, 2006), http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2006-45.htm (revealing that KPMG senior managers failed to complete
audit).
185. Gretchen Morgenson, Crisis Looms in Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007,
at News Analysis 01.
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People maybe didn’t care what Firm B was doing. They did what they
wanted to do.
MR. MILLER: I must tell you, Paul Volcker 186 made a speech last
week, on April 8, in which he talked about all these problems. 187 If you
get a chance, read it. He talked about all of these problems from his
perspective. It’s really quite a speech.
MR. KASWELL: Mickie?
MS. SIEBERT: The government did have a precedent in helping
companies. The government guaranteed Chrysler and made money on
it. 188 The government guaranteed Lockheed 189 (I was involved in that; I
was specializing in aviation stocks) and made money. So if the government can guarantee something, why can’t we create a way that the
government will make money on this so it won’t be a gift? We don’t
want to make it a gift. We can’t afford to make it a gift. But why can’t
we create something, with all the brains in this country, where the
government can guarantee and make some money on it when the time
comes?
MR. KASWELL: This is a convenient segue to the last part of the
discussion, which is: Where do we go from here? There are all these
competing proposals in Washington now, with the Administration and
the House and the Senate having different views. 190 Everybody has
something to say about whether or not this package is better than that
package: does it go far enough? Does it go too far? Are we rewarding
people for behavior that we shouldn’t reward them for?
I think there is certainly a political imperative to do something. The
question is: What’s the right thing to do in this situation? I’m not sure
186. Paul A Volcker – Biography, http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/Pvolckerbio.
html.
187. See Paul Volcker, Former Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the
Economic Club of New York (Apr. 8, 2008), http://econclubny.org/files/Transcript
_Volcker_April_2008.pdf.
188. See Allan Sloan, On the Brink of DISASTER, 157(7) FORTUNE 78 (Apr. 14,
2008) (“[T]he government made $311 million from stock-purchase warrants it extracted
for issuing the guarantee.”).
189. See John Cobbs, When Companies Get Too Big to Fail, BUS. WEEK, INDUS.
ED., Jan. 27, 1975, at 16 (noting the government’s bailout of Lockheed Aircraft with a
$250 million loan guarantee).
190. See Jane Sasseen, A Grand Old Problem for the GOP, BUS. WEEK, Mar. 24,
2008, In Depth Section, at 46, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/
content/08_12/b4076046793012.htm?campaign_id=yhoo.
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that we can ever pass a law that will always prevent failure from
occurring, as Gus said a while back.
But what are the right steps to [take] and what are the wrong steps?
MS. MORGENSON: That’s a lot of territory. Certainly, I would
say regulators who regulate would be on my wish list.
[Laughter]
MR. KASWELL: That would be a start in your judgment?
MS. MORGENSON: That would be number one on my wish list.
I just feel like the regulators didn’t really have an appetite. There were
rules they could have enforced that they did not, things as simple as
HUD rules on violations of what you put on a mortgage and how much
you are allowed to charge for certain fees in the mortgage. 191 Those
kinds of violations were never pursued.
Could we have regulators who have an appetite for regulating? I
don’t know how you make that happen. But it just was such a failure
this time around. To me that would be job one.
I [also] think disclosure has to be improved. I’m not sure that Stan
O’Neal 192 understands what a CDO 193 is. I think that he got bounced (he
took a lot of money with him, 194 so I’m not crying for him) but I don’t
think he understood what a collateralized debt obligation that was
crammed with subprime mortgages was and how that was going to
impact his company’s balance sheet. I would like him to try to explain
that to me. I don’t think he could.
So how about having people who really ask the tough questions and
push back on these things when you’re making money hand over fist?
Who’s in the boardrooms saying, “What about that? Gee, that’s a huge
increase in your derivatives book this year. Is that putting the firm at
risk at all?” There didn’t seem to be any appetite for that either.
MR. NEIMAN: When we talk about regulators – I am in a law
school, so I can use the term federal preemption 195 – states like New
191. See 24 C.F.R. § 203.27 (1971) (listing the charges, fees, or discounts a mortgagee may collect from a mortgagor).
192. Stan O’Neal was formerly the CEO of Merrill Lynch.
193. See Standard & Poor’s, Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO Criteria, supra
note 96.
194. See Rob Cox, Prince and the Pauper, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2007, at B14
(noting Stan O’Neal’s $160 million severance package).
195. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 27 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007)
(holding that under the National Bank Act, a national bank’s mortgage business whether
conducted by the national bank or its subsidiaries is subject to federal preemption).
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York did take strong actions, both in the Attorney General’s Office and
in the Banking Department, starting in 1999 with large actions against
Household 196 and Delta Funding 197 , highlighting and bringing
significant actions against subprime lenders for predatory lending
practices. 198
What was needed was an additional effort at the federal level.
Instead of welcoming that and pursuing it both in terms of national
banks – not only to the extent that they originate, but also to the extent
that they are participating in the securitization process – the response
was: “Sorry, you cannot even investigate these types of unfair lending or
other violations of national banks. In fact, we are going to expand our
interpretations of federal preemption and prohibit you from bringing
actions or investigating or supervising subsidiaries of national banks.” 199
The federal regulators spent more time and effort thwarting the
efforts of the states back in 1999, 2000, and 2001, which could have
certainly made a difference. 200 We’ve got to get beyond these federal
regulatory turf wars and really look at how to recognize where state and
federal regulators have to work together.
MR. COHEN: Let me pick up on that. That is one of the more
curious points. You know the Chinese curse, “May you live in interesting times.” 201 Federalism has been turned on its head, in a way. You
have a federal government that is intent on enforcing its rights under
preemption to keep the states out of various issues. If you think about
196. See Michael Cooper, Spitzer Inquiries Net The State $786 Million, A Record
Sum, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2004, at B2 (discussing Household Finance’s $37 million
settlement under accusations of predatory lending).
197. See Press Release, Office of N. Y. State Attorney Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer
Announces Landmark $6 Million Settlement With Long Island Mortgage Company
(June 23, 1999), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/1999/jun/jun23a_99.html.
198. See id.
199. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory
Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1308
(2006) (discussing recent developments in the federal preemption of state predatory
lending laws as well as the validity of regulatory attempts at preemption).
200. See id. at 1307 (“Recently, the federal government is thwarting efforts of state
legislators to protect homeowners in their states by preempting state statutes regulating
predatory lending abuses. Regulations preempt state predatory lending statutes applicable to national banks and savings associations . . . and proposed legislation would
preempt the statutes altogether.”).
201. See The Phrase Finder, May You Live In Interesting Times, http://www.phrases.
org.uk/meanings/245000.html (discussing the meaning and origin of the phrase).
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traditional notions of preemption (at least when I was in law school)
preemption was always [invoked] so that the feds could dominate the
field. Now we find – and this happens in real cases – that when there is
a state effort to issue an investigatory subpoena to a banking entity . . .
[the state] can’t even do that because it falls within the scope of federal
jurisdiction. 202 The bank will come in and litigate, with the assistance of
the feds, [to seek] to keep the state regulators or state investigators out of
the area. 203
We had a curious [situation] in the AG’s Office not too long ago.
We brought a lawsuit. Everybody thought it was against Washington
Mutual. It wasn’t. It was against two appraisal companies that were
doing business with Washington Mutual. At the middle of the case was
basically an empty spot where WAMU would normally have sat because
of the preemption issue. We knew litigating that issue, at least in the
Second Circuit, would have been a fool’s errand because the Second
Circuit has already spoken to this. 204 But if you don’t have the feds
willing to take the initiative, and instead [using preemption to] more or
less keep[] other potential regulators out of the field, these are the kinds
of issues you are going to run into.
MR. PREZIOSO: I think that the federalism point is awfully
important. Maybe I just have too benign a view of the world, but I
actually think all the regulators, more or less – and there are some
exceptions – were trying to do what they thought was best in light of the
way they saw their jobs.
202. See, e.g., Clearing House Ass’n, LLC v. Spitzer, 394 F. Supp. 2d 620
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). In this case, the plaintiff, Clearing House Association, sued the
Attorney General of the State of New York to enjoin him from instituting enforcement
actions or investigating plaintiff’s national bank members and their subsidiaries relating
to their residential mortgage lending practices. At issue was whether the threatened
Fair Housing Act (FHA) action was prohibited by § 484(a) of the National Bank Act’s,
12 U.S.C.S. § 484(a), limitation on states’ visitorial authority. In granting the plaintiff’s
motion for an injunction, the court held that an action brought in the state’s parens
patriae capacity to enforce the FHA’s fair lending provisions against plaintiff’s national
bank members or their operating subsidiaries constituted a form of visitorial authority
prohibited by § 484(a) of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.S. § 484, and was not
authorized by federal law. Therefore, the New York State Attorney General was
enjoined from instituting any judicial action premised on the state’s parens patriae
authority to enforce the FHA’s fair lending provisions against plaintiff’s national bank
members or their operating subsidiaries. Id.
203. See id.
204. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 321 (2d Cir. 2005).
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But I think one of the things we face, if you think about where we
are now in terms of accountability, is a system that has grown up with a
history at the state level, a history at the federal level, and a division
between regulation of banks and thrifts and broker-dealers and so forth.
It isn’t very well suited to the kind of marketplace that we have today,
the kinds of international institutions that we have.
I think it is important to strengthen all of the regulators and to think
about ways to create a better integration. At the federal level, what the
federal [government] can do best is pull together information from a lot
of different sources. When I was talking earlier about how people didn’t
foresee this, that includes at the federal level. I think there aren’t so
many regulators, even at the federal level today, that have the kind of
access across the board to banking institutions, securities firms, insurance companies, mortgage brokers, that would have been needed to
really understand what was going on here. I think to some extent we
don’t even have that information together today. So I think trying to
figure out how to strengthen that is awfully important.
By the same token, I think that the point about the state regulators is
very well taken. There is absolutely no reason that the system ought to
be one in which states aren’t encouraged, obviously within the confines
of a broader national and international economy, to be quite active in
pursuing the kinds of interests that have always made state regulation so
useful. Sometimes it is called a laboratory. There are all kinds of good
ways to characterize it.
I think that debate is maybe starting now. Unfortunately, given our
political cycle – and I am not trying to make a partisan comment – we
happen to be in an election year. It is going to be quite difficult for
people to implement broad, far-reaching changes until after we have our
election, at least. That is a shame for all of us, because I think we are
losing time that we don’t necessarily want to lose.
MS. SIEBERT: We all know that the products have become much
more complicated. The derivatives have changed the entire industry.205
We are obviously going to have new regulation. I think we should have
regulation by function. There is no reason that the same regulator can’t
do the savings banks and the S&Ls and the commercial banks and the
foreign banks if they are in that business. Otherwise it doesn’t work.
There are too many different regulators and there is too much dupli-

205.

See Unterman, supra note 103, at 132.
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cation.
MR. KASWELL: If you look at the Treasury blueprint 206 that came
out, I agree; I don’t think there is any likelihood that that is going to
become law before the end of this Congress. [But] I think if you view it
as the beginning of a process and a discussion, it is a very interesting
document, whether you agree with it or not. It does take on functional
regulation fairly directly and says that the problem with functional
regulation as we now have it – and I have always been a fan of it – was
that it doesn’t allow a more comprehensive view of a particular institution, because you have different regulators looking at the bank or the
broker-dealer or the insurance, which would be at the state level. 207 I’m
not sure that is entirely accurate, but I think it is fair to ask: Is this really
the right model that we have had?
We have a model that has grown up in many instances more as a
response to a crisis; the 1929 crash, as Harvey mentioned before, created
all the New Deal legislation. 208 And we are now competing not just
nationally, but [also] internationally. The Treasury has looked at the
Australian model of the Twin Peaks 209 regulator, and the U.K. model of
the FSA. 210
This is something where intelligent people can and should disagree
as to what the right prescription is. But I don’t think that anyone would
invent the system that we’ve got now. It is an accident of history rather
than of logic.
MR. MILLER: I think it is fair to say that the market has outpaced

206.

DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGUSTRUCTURE (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
reports/Blueprint.pdf.
207. Id. at 4.
208. See Fred Wright, The Effect of New Deal Real Estate Residential Finance and
Foreclosure Policies Made in Response to the Real Estate Conditions of the Great
Depression, 57 ALA. L. REV. 231, 242 (2005) (discussing New Deal legislation enacted
in responses to real estate conditions after the Great Depression).
209. Jeremy Cooper, Deputy Chairman, Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm’n, Paper
Presented to the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n of Braz.: The Integration of Financial
Regulatory Authorities – The Australian Experience (Sept. 4-5. 2005), http://www.asic.
gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/integration-financial-regulatory-authorities.
pdf/$file/integration-financial-regulatory-authorities.pdf (discussing the Australian
“Twin Peaks” model).
210. See Financial Services Authority, http://www.fsa.gov.uk (last visited Oct. 18,
2008).
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the regulators. The complexity of the market, the derivatives and all of
these other sophisticated securities . . . . [T]hink of the CDO market.
You have $45 trillion of notional value which only deals with $5.9
trillion of debt. 211 So somebody is trading in these derivatives that has
no attachment to the debt, and nobody knows who the counter-parties
are. 212
I think there is a real issue as to whether the regulators can ever get
up to speed on this. You have a market which is basically opaque. I
don’t really know how any government is going to face up to that issue.
MS. MORGENSON: I think one way to deal with the credit default
swap market – which is what I think you’re talking about with the $45
trillion notional – would be to increase margin requirements. 213 Now,
nobody ever wants to do that, including Alan Greenspan, who back in
the Internet bubble was asked at an Economic Club of New York dinner,
“Why don’t you raise margin requirements?” 214 This was in 1999, when
Internet stocks only went up and individuals were flocking to the stock
market. He said he didn’t believe in it, that raising margin requirements
didn’t work. 215 Well then why . . . is it in your arsenal of potential fixes
or potential things to do?
I would say: Why not require greater margins? I think the margin
requirements on credit default swaps are minuscule. That would at least
make people focus on what their exposure is, if they had to put up
considerably more money to trade these securities.
MR. MILLER: Also capital requirement rules that [require]

211. See Bill McIntosh, Soros Urges Cleanup of CDS Market, HEDGEWORLD DAILY
NEWS, Apr. 4, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 6392996 (confirming estimated notional
value of approximately $45 trillion as of April 2008).
212. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, What Created This Monster?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/business/
23how.html (discussing derivatives as a “stealth market”).
213. See InvestorWords.com, http://www.investorwords.com/2959/margin_require
ment.html (defining margin requirement as “the amount that an investor must deposit in
a margin account before buying on margin or selling short, as required by the Federal
Reserve Board’s Regulation T”).
214. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks to the Economic Club of New York (Jan. 13, 2000), http://fraser.
stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/ag00/download/29043/Greenspan_20000113.pdf.
215. See Patrice Hill, Fed Faces Pressure to Deflate Markets, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2000, at B8 (noting that Greenspan stated that increasing margin requirements has little
effect on stock prices).
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institutions to have a certain amount of capital on hand. 216 Those went
by the board. And was the repeal of Glass-Steagall 217 a good thing?
You have banks that have never been able to merge their investment
banking facility with their banking facility. 218 The banking facility is
based on a balance sheet and a financial statement; the investment
banking arm is fee-driven. 219 So you have two different incentives in
one institution. 220 Sometimes the fee-driven part of the bank takes
command and you get a . . . (I’m not going to name the bank).
MR. NEIMAN: I think this is going to be one of the largest
challenges for [both] U.S. regulators [and] global regulators. How do
you keep up with innovation? If you can keep up, is there a constraint?
Even though I don’t have any teenagers, I think of it as: What’s
your responsibility for supervision over a gifted teenager? I assume
you’ve got to give [him or her] enough latitude. But as soon as [he or
she] blows up the basement or drives the car off the road, you do have to
exercise a degree of supervision.
Same with capital and margin. I think the two I would have highlighted would be to what extent can leverage be used, as well as assuring
that there is a safety net to ensure no systemic problems arise out of any
failures.
MS. SIEBERT: I think it is a great time to try to get international
securities regulations, specifically margin; if a hedge fund can’t borrow
in the States, it goes to London, where it can borrow and it’s between
[the hedge fund] and the bank. Private equity – you can see deals being

216. See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK COMPREHENSIVE VERSION 26 (2006), http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf?noframes=1.
217. See Banking Act of 1933, supra note 50.
218. One of the main reasons for repealing the Glass-Steagall Act in the first place
was to permit banks to engage in both investment and commercial banking. See John
Steele Gordon, Manager’s Journal: May Glass-Steagall Rest in Peace, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 26, 1999, at A26 (“Glass-Steagall’s most important provision required banks to
choose between being depository banks and investment banks . . . .”).
219. See Robert Parenteau, The Economics of Euphoria: Financialization and the
U.S. Bubble, Prepared for the Political Econ. Research Inst. Conference on
Financialization of the Global Econ. (Dec. 6-7, 2006) (first draft, Nov. 28, 2001),
available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/parenteau.2.0.drft.pdf.
220. See id.
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done at six, seven, eight, nine, ten times to one. 221 It doesn’t give these
buyers a time to have a regular poor quarter or two.
I asked the head of one of the large German banks six months ago.
He said, “Oh no, we don’t want your regulations.” Well, they’re now
talking, since they’ve had a few of their own institutions get into trouble
because of the subprime. 222
I think it gives us a wonderful opportunity to set up international
regulations on those kinds of things – leverage, margin. These are the
things that break us so fast. All [the hedge funds] do is pick up and go
abroad.
MR. PREZIOSO: I am a huge fan of enhanced international
coordination for a lot of those same reasons. But I think it is important
to come back here. I don’t think it is completely fair to all the regulators
or the heads of these companies. I’m not sure the criticisms of people
like Stan O’Neal and Alan are so merited.
You can have lots of margin and capital requirements. We have
margin and capital requirements. There are a variety of reasons why, in
the international context, those are not meaningful. There are a variety
of reasons why, even without the international context, they are hard to
apply. 223 But all of them depend – and this goes to what I think is the
most important thing here – on being able to price instruments. You can
write capital rules to your heart’s content. The banking regulators have
been doing this for a long time.
Curiously, of all the areas in which there is the most international
cooperation, bank capital standards are probably the most developed of
all of the systems that we have. 224 It shows, I think, that even when you
have a very good system, if you do not have markets that work in terms
221. See generally Stuart Washington, Bankers Beware, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Feb. 10, 2007, at 43 (discussing private equity and debt strategies).
222. See, e.g., Sub-prime Crisis Hits German Bank, BBC NEWS, Apr. 3, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7328694.stm.
223. See Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor, Cent. Bank of Malay., Keynote Address at the
Public-Private Dialogue Session of the 7th SEACEN Conference of Dirs. of
Supervision of Asia Pacific Econs: Cross-Border Challenges in Implementing BASEL
II in Emerging Economies (Aug. 4, 2005), http://www.bis.org/review/r050826d.pdf.
224. See generally International Guidelines for Bank Capital Adequacy and
Management: Hearing on H.R. 2043 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer
Credit and the H. Comm. on H. Fin. Serv., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Donald
Powell, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.) (discussing the development of the revised
international capital standards as well as its strengths and weaknesses).
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of pricing and transparency, it is very difficult for any regulator or
businessperson to make decisions that ultimately will not entail very
significant risk. 225
Risk is inherent in what financial institutions do. You can eliminate
risk in financial institutions, but you can only do it by taking away the
opportunity for profit. The only way you can be sure that the bank will
always have the money when you come to withdraw it is for the bank to
put it in a drawer in the back room and not lend it to the others on the
panel for their mortgages or for any other purpose. We know that.
So to me, the focus on those items is, obviously, appropriate. We
need to think about whether the capital standards are right, whether we
have international coordination, which I think is critical here. But I do
think that focusing a bit on how one could enhance transparency in these
markets, [as well as] what the [state and federal] governments can do to
enhance that transparency, and to create incentives toward liquidity and
transparency in the way financial institutions look at what they are
doing, is an important step.
We are never going to stop these crises. We are never going to stop
the system from having losses that are not anticipated. What we see in
the stock market (at least in the United States) [is that] when prices
collapse, you know what they have collapsed to. I think that allows this
kind of crisis to work itself through more quickly and more in tune with
the kinds of tools for people (who I really think were acting in their own
interest) to try to find these things. I don’t believe that people intentionally did things to embarrass themselves, to get themselves fired, etc.
They just didn’t have the information because the market isn’t
functioning in a way that delivers it.
MR. KASWELL: I think we are just about out of time.
MR. MILLER: I had a question. I came here to be educated. So
let me ask a question. What the hell is a CDO?
MS. MORGENSON: A collateralized debt obligation, which is a
pool of pools. A pool of mortgages, what’s called a residential
mortgage-backed security (RMBS) 226 , that’s a pool of, say, thousands of
225. Cf. Reem Heakal, What Was The Glass-Steagall Act?, Investopedia.com,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/071603.asp (asserting that more transparent
markets lessen the possibility of masking unsound investments and assuming too much
risk).
226. Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS), Investopedia.com, http://
www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rmbs.asp.
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mortgages – your mortgage, my mortgage, everybody in this room’s
mortgage. A CDO has different combinations of those kinds of pools in
it. So it’s like an RMBS square essentially. 227
Then there’s [what is] called a CDO square, 228 which is a square of
a square. So you are talking about some rocket-science debt.
MR. MILLER: And when you finally know what a CDO is, they
change the acronym to something else.
MS. MORGENSON: L-O-S-S. [Laughter]
MR. KASWELL: On that upbeat note, I do think we ought to remember that this is America. We will work through these problems.
The markets will work together. The private sector and the public sector
will sort it out. We will get through this.
With that, I want to thank the panelists for a great job.
PROF. FISCH: Please join us outside for the reception.
[Adjournment: 7:33 p.m.]

227. Collateralized Debt Obligation, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.
com/terms/c/cdo.asp.
228. Collateralized Debt Obligation Squared, Investopedia.com, http://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/c/cdo2.asp.

